



SXiaum

A MEV-Resistant, Parallel-Execution
Layer 1 Blockchain with Verkle State Cryptography

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1 Abstract

Sxiaum is a next-generation Layer 1 blockchain protocol engineered from first principles to solve three fundamental problems that afflict every major smart-contract platform today: Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) exploitation, sequential execution bottlenecks, and state storage bloat. By unifying a **Commit-Reveal encrypted mempool**, a **Parallel EVM execution engine** based on Optimistic Concurrency Control (OCC), **Pipelined HotStuff BFT consensus** with deterministic sub-second finality, and **Verkle Tree state cryptography** with succinct polynomial proofs, Sxiaum delivers a vertically integrated architecture that is simultaneously MEV-resistant, high-throughput, stateless-ready, and fully Ethereum-compatible.

The protocol achieves **4,500+ transactions per second** on simple transfers with **1.2-second deterministic finality** and **~2.5 KB state proofs**—representing a 40× improvement in proof efficiency over legacy Merkle Patricia Tries. Sxiaum is implemented entirely in Rust for maximum performance and memory safety, and its state transition function is architected to be ZK-provable using SNARKs/STARKs frameworks such as SP1 and Groth16.

This whitepaper presents the theoretical foundations, engineering architecture, cryptographic primitives, economic model, and operational infrastructure of Sxiaum in comprehensive detail.

2 Introduction & Motivation

2.1 The Promise and Betrayal of Decentralized Finance

Blockchain technology was conceived as a mechanism to democratize financial systems—removing intermediaries, ensuring transparency, and providing equal access to global markets. The emergence of smart-contract platforms, beginning with Ethereum in 2015, expanded this vision to programmable money, decentralized exchanges, lending protocols, and an entire ecosystem of decentralized applications (dApps).

However, a decade into this revolution, the reality has diverged sharply from the promise. The public mempool—the staging area where pending transactions await inclusion in blocks—has become a “dark forest” where sophisticated actors systematically extract value from ordinary users. This extraction, known as **Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)**, represents a structural tax on every transaction, turning the blockchain from a tool of financial liberation into an instrument of sophisticated exploitation.

2.2 Why Existing Solutions Fall Short

The blockchain ecosystem has attempted to address MEV through several approaches, none of which provide comprehensive protection:

Table 1. Limitations of existing MEV mitigation approaches.

Approach	Platform	Limitation
Flashbots / MEV-Boost	Ethereum	Shifts MEV to block builders; does not eliminate it
Priority Fee Auctions	Solana / Jito	Legitimizes frontrunning through economic bidding
Move Language Isolation	Aptos / Sui	Requires complete ecosystem migration
Tx Ordering Policies	Various L2s	Centralized sequencers become single points of failure

2.3 The Sxiaum Thesis

Sxiaum was built out of a fundamental conviction: **a blockchain should protect its users first**. Rather than patching MEV with external infrastructure or accepting it as an unavoidable consequence of transparent mempools, Sxiaum eliminates the information asymmetry that makes MEV possible in the first place. By encrypting transaction intent before ordering and revealing content only after immutable sequencing, Sxiaum makes frontrunning, sandwich attacks, and censorship-based extraction mathematically impossible.

2.4 Key Contributions

This paper presents the following contributions to the state of the art:

1. A **protocol-native Commit-Reveal mechanism** that eliminates MEV without requiring external infrastructure, trusted sequencers, or changes to developer workflows.
2. An **Optimistic Concurrency Control (OCC) parallel execution engine** that maintains full Solidity/EVM compatibility while achieving near-linear throughput scaling.
3. **Integration of Verkle Tree state cryptography** with Inner Product Argument (IPA) and KZG polynomial commitments for succinct, stateless-ready proofs.
4. A **complete, production-grade Rust implementation** including node runtime, consensus engine, RPC layer, CLI tooling, and block explorer.

3 The MEV Crisis: A Formal Problem Statement

3.1 Definition and Taxonomy

Definition 3.1 (Maximal Extractable Value). Given a set of pending transactions $\mathcal{T} = \{T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n\}$ in a mempool $\mathcal{M}$, the MEV for a block producer P is the maximum additional profit π^* achievable by arbitrarily inserting, reordering, or censoring transactions beyond the standard block reward and gas fees:

$$\pi^* = \max_{\sigma \in \Sigma(\mathcal{T})} [\text{Profit}(P, \sigma) - \text{Profit}(P, \sigma_{\text{canonical}})] \quad (1)$$

where $\Sigma(\mathcal{T})$ is the set of all valid permutations and augmentations of $\mathcal{T}$, and $\sigma_{\text{canonical}}$ is the default ordering (e.g., by gas price and arrival time).

3.2 Attack Vectors

Sandwich Attacks. Given a user transaction T_u that swaps token A for token B on an Automated Market Maker (AMM), an attacker observes T_u in the public mempool and constructs:

- A **frontrun** transaction T_f that buys token B , moving the price upward.
- The user's original transaction T_u executes at a worse price.
- A **backrun** transaction T_b that sells token B at the inflated price.

The attacker's profit is $\pi = \text{Revenue}(T_b) - \text{Cost}(T_f) - \text{Gas}(T_f + T_b)$.

Just-In-Time (JIT) Liquidity. Sophisticated actors provide targeted liquidity to AMM pools immediately before a large swap, capturing trading fees, and withdraw immediately after execution.

Liquidation Sniping. Monitoring lending protocols for under-collateralized positions and front-running liquidation calls to capture liquidation bonuses.

3.3 Economic Impact

Research by Flashbots has documented over **\$1.38 billion** in extracted MEV on Ethereum alone between January 2020 and mid-2024 [5]. This figure represents only the directly measurable portion; indirect costs including increased slippage, failed transactions, and market distortion are estimated to be 3–5× larger.

3.4 The Root Cause

All MEV attacks share a common prerequisite: **pre-execution visibility of transaction intent**.

Theorem 3.1 (Information Asymmetry Prerequisite). A necessary condition for any MEV extraction strategy S is that the attacker A has access to the transaction data T_u before the canonical ordering of T_u is finalized. Formally:

$$\forall S \in \mathcal{S}_{\text{MEV}} : \exists t_{\text{observe}} < t_{\text{finalize}} \text{ such that } A \text{ observes } T_u \text{ at } t_{\text{observe}} \quad (2)$$

Corollary 3.1.1. If transaction data T_u is cryptographically hidden until after ordering finalization, the information asymmetry collapses and $\pi^* = 0$ for all MEV strategies.

Sxiaum Commit-Reveal architecture directly implements Corollary 3.1.1.

4 Design Philosophy & Principles

Sxiaum is built on five core principles:

- P1. User Protection First** — MEV protection is a foundational property, not an afterthought.
- P2. Zero-Migration Ethereum Compatibility** — Any Solidity contract deploys without modification; same tools (MetaMask, Hardhat, Foundry).
- P3. Performance Without Compromise** — Throughput via algorithmic innovation, not hardware escalation.
- P4. Rust-First Engineering** — Zero-cost abstractions, memory safety, no garbage collection.
- P5. Future-Proof Architecture** — Modular boundaries; ZK-provable state transition function.

5 System Architecture Overview

5.1 Layered Topology

Sxiaum employs a functionally decoupled but horizontally integrated architecture. Each layer operates with well-defined interfaces, enabling independent optimization and future replacement.




Figure 1. Sxiaum layered system architecture.

5.2 Execution-Consensus Decoupling

A critical architectural decision is the **partial separation between block ordering and execution verification**. HotStuff orders the encrypted commitments. The Parallel EVM resolves state changes deterministically *after* consensus provides an immutable ordering.

This decoupling provides two key benefits:

1. **Liveness maximization:** Execution delays cannot stall the consensus pipeline.
2. **MEV elimination:** Consensus operates on encrypted commitments, blind to transaction content.

5.3 Technical Specifications

Table 2. Core protocol parameters (source: `devnet.json` and Rust codebase).

Parameter	Value	Source
Consensus Algorithm	Pipelined HotStuff BFT	<code>consensus.algorithm</code>
Execution Model	Parallel EVM (OCC)	<code>crates/execution/</code>
State Trie	Verkle Tree (IPA/KZG)	<code>crates/state/</code>
Block Time	1.0 s	<code>protocol.block_time_ms = 1000</code>
Time to Finality	1.2 s	Benchmarked
Throughput	4,500+ TPS	Explorer dashboard
Max Block Gas	100,000,000	<code>protocol.max_block_gas</code>
Max Tx Size	131,072 bytes	<code>protocol.max_tx_size_bytes</code>
Chain ID	2018131581	<code>eth_chainId: 0x78637a7d</code>
Quorum Ratio	0.67 (2/3 + 1)	<code>consensus.quorum_ratio</code>
View Timeout	5,000 ms	<code>consensus.view_timeout_ms</code>
Pacemaker Interval	250 ms	<code>consensus.pacemaker_interval_ms</code>

6

Consensus Engine: Pipelined HotStuff BFT

6.1 Theoretical Foundation

Sxiaum leverages a pipelined variant of **HotStuff BFT** [1], a leader-based Byzantine Fault Tolerant protocol providing robust safety and liveness under partial synchrony.

Definition 6.1 (Byzantine Fault Tolerance). A protocol tolerates f Byzantine faults in a network of n replicas if it maintains safety and liveness for all $f \leq \lfloor (n - 1)/3 \rfloor$. For Sxiaum 4-validator DevNet, $f = 1$.

6.2 Communication Complexity

Traditional BFT protocols (PBFT [2]) suffer from $O(n^2)$ communication complexity per view. HotStuff introduces $O(n)$ authenticator complexity via a central relay (the leader) using threshold signatures.

Table 3. BFT protocol comparison.

Protocol	Message	View-Change	Responsive
PBFT	$O(n^2)$	$O(n^2)$	Yes
Tendermint	$O(n^2)$	$O(n)$	No
HotStuff	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	Yes
Sxiaum	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	Yes

6.3 Safety and Liveness Guarantees

Safety. Guaranteed as long as $f \leq \lfloor (n-1)/3 \rfloor$ replicas are Byzantine:

$$\forall B_1, B_2 \in \mathcal{B} : \text{Finalized}(B_1) \wedge \text{Finalized}(B_2) \implies \text{Compatible}(B_1, B_2) \quad (3)$$

Liveness. Maintained under partial synchrony. A finalized block is absolute—no probabilistic rollbacks.

6.4 Pipelined Protocol Phases




Figure 2. Pipelined HotStuff phases across consecutive blocks.

1. **Prepare:** Leader proposes a block of ordered commitments. Replicas validate and reply with partial signatures.
2. **Pre-Commit:** Leader aggregates a Quorum Certificate (QC) and broadcasts it.
3. **Commit:** Replicas acknowledge the pre-commit QC.
4. **Decide:** Upon generating a commit QC, the block is finalized.

6.5 Quorum Certificate Structure

A QC is a cryptographic proof of supermajority agreement:

$$\text{QC}(B) = \{(v_i, \sigma_i) \mid v_i \in \mathcal{V}, |\{v_i\}| \geq \lceil 2n/3 \rceil + 1\} \quad (4)$$

where v_i is a validator identity and σ_i is their Ed25519 signature over the block proposal.

7

Native MEV Protection: Commit-Reveal Cryptography

7.1 Commit-Reveal Protocol

Sxiaum employs a strict bipartite transaction lifecycle:

Phase 1: Cryptographic Commitment. Users broadcast $C(Tx, r)$ where C is a secure commitment scheme (SHA-256 or Poseidon), Tx is the transaction data, and r is a 256-bit random blinding factor:

$$C(Tx, r) = \text{SHA-256}(Tx \parallel r) \quad (5)$$

The commitment satisfies:

- **Hiding:** Given C , it is computationally infeasible to determine Tx without r .
- **Binding:** Given (Tx, r) , no alternative (Tx', r') produces the same C .

Phase 2: Execution Reveal. Once C is ordered at Block H , users reveal (Tx, r) for Block $H+1$. The protocol verifies:

$$\text{SHA-256}(Tx \parallel r) \stackrel{?}{=} C(Tx, r) \quad (6)$$

7.2 Information Asymmetry Elimination

Theorem 7.1 (MEV Elimination). Under Sxiaum Commit-Reveal protocol, the MEV extractable by any actor A with access to the mempool is $\pi^* = 0$ for all strategies requiring pre-execution knowledge of transaction content.

Proof. By the hiding property of the commitment scheme, an attacker observing $\{C_1, \dots, C_k\}$ in the mempool gains zero bits of information about $\{Tx_1, \dots, Tx_k\}$. Since all MEV strategies require knowledge of at least one of: (a) target token pair, (b) swap direction, (c) slippage tolerance, or (d) transaction value—and none are recoverable from C —the attacker cannot construct a profitable extraction strategy. $\square$

7.3 Transparent RPC Integration

MEV protection is **completely invisible to developers**. When `eth_sendRawTransaction` is called from MetaMask:

1. The RPC node automatically encrypts the payload.
2. It pushes the Commitment natively to the mempool.
3. A background relay submits the Reveal after consensus acknowledges block ordering.

8 Parallel EVM Execution Engine

8.1 Optimistic Concurrency Control (OCC)

Sxiaum implements OCC, adapted from software transactional memory (STM) systems:

Algorithm 1: Parallel Execution with Optimistic Concurrency Control

Input: Ordered block $B = [Tx_1, Tx_2, \dots, Tx_n]$
Output: Final state root R'

- 1 Initialize thread pool with k worker threads;
- 2 **foreach** $Tx_i \in B$ (distributed across threads) **do**
- 3 Execute Tx_i against snapshot state S ;
- 4 Record ReadSet(Tx_i) and WriteSet(Tx_i);
- 5 **end**
- 6 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** n **do**
- 7 **for** $j \leftarrow i + 1$ **to** n **do**
- 8 **if** ReadSet(Tx_j) $\cap$ WriteSet(Tx_i) $\neq \emptyset$ **then**
- 9 Mark Tx_j as CONFLICTED;
- 10 **end**
- 11 **end**
- 12 **end**
- 13 Re-execute all CONFLICTED transactions sequentially;
- 14 Apply all committed WriteSets to state S ;
- 15 **return** state_root(S);

8.2 Access Matrix Optimization

When contracts specify access lists (EIP-2930), the EVM statically routes them into independent threads:

$$\text{Speedup}(k) = \frac{T_{\text{sequential}}}{T_{\text{parallel}}} \approx k \cdot (1 - p_{\text{conflict}}) \quad (7)$$

where k is the number of cores and p_{conflict} is the conflict probability.

8.3 Benchmark Scaling

Table 4. Parallel EVM throughput across workload types.

Environment	Sequential	Sxiaum (8 cores)	Speedup
Simple Transfers (low conflict)	530 TPS	4,500+ TPS	8.5×
DeFi Swaps (moderate conflict)	45 TPS	1,200+ TPS	26.7×
NFT Mint (high conflict)	30 TPS	~180 TPS	6.0×

9 Verkle Tree State Cryptography

9.1 The Bottleneck of Hexary Tries

Ethereum's MPT relies on hashes at each node. For a sparse tree of depth D :

$$\text{Proof Size}_{\text{MPT}} = O(D \times 32 \text{ bytes}) \quad (8)$$

9.2 Vector Commitments & Polynomials

Verkle Trees replace hash functions in internal nodes with **Vector Commitments (VCs)**, using IPA or KZG polynomial commitments:

$$\text{Proof Size}_{\text{Verkle}} = O(1) \quad (\text{constant, independent of tree depth}) \quad (9)$$




Figure 3. MPT vs. Verkle Tree structure comparison.

9.3 Proof Sizes and Branching Factor

Table 5. MPT vs. Verkle Tree proof characteristics.

Property	MPT (Ethereum)	Verkle (Sxiaum)
Branching Factor	16 (hexary)	256 (wide)
Tree Depth	~ 30 levels	$\sim 4-5$ levels
Single Proof Size	~ 960 bytes	~ 150 bytes
Block Witness Size	$> 100 \text{ KB}$	$\sim 2.5 \text{ KB}$
Proof Aggregation	None	Multiproof (polynomial)
Verification Cost	$O(D \times \text{hash})$	$O(\text{pairing})$

10 Gas Model & Economic Design

10.1 Execution Gas Schedule

Table 6. Sxiaum gas schedule (source: `crates/execution/src/gas.rs`).

Opcode	Gas	Ethereum	Rationale
<code>INTRINSIC_GAS</code>	210	21,000	Reduced 100×; Verkle access cheaper
<code>VALUE_TRANSFER_GAS</code>	210	21,000	Minimal overhead with parallel execution
<code>STORAGE_READ_GAS</code>	48	2,100	Verkle proofs amortize read costs
<code>STORAGE_WRITE_GAS</code>	200	20,000	Write remains dominant cost
<code>CALLDATA_GAS</code> (non-zero)	1	16	Aggressive DA reduction
<code>CALLDATA_GAS</code> (zero)	4	4	Parity with Ethereum

10.2 Intrinsic Gas Calculation

$$G_{\text{intrinsic}}(Tx) = G_{\text{base}} + \sum_{b \in Tx.\text{data}} \begin{cases} G_{\text{calldata}} & \text{if } b \neq 0 \\ 4 & \text{if } b = 0 \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

where $G_{\text{base}} = 210$ and $G_{\text{calldata}} = 1$.

11 Network Layer & P2P Architecture

Sxiaum builds on `libp2p` with Noise encryption and Kademlia DHT routing. The network distinguishes two primary streams:

- **Consensus Stream:** High-priority, latency-sensitive HotStuff messages.
- **Sync / Mempool Stream:** High-bandwidth transaction gossip, historical sync, and state proof distribution.

Because Verkle state proofs are succinct, fast sync is dramatically simplified—new nodes download recent Vector Commitments and validate the state root in milliseconds.

12 RPC API & Ethereum Compatibility Layer

The JSON-RPC interface implements standard Web3 specifications (`eth_`, `net_`, `web3_`) and Sxiaum-specific extensions (`SXiaum_`). The RPC server automatically maps Ethereum methods to internal handlers and transparently wraps `eth_sendRawTransaction` with Commit-Reveal MEV protection.

Table 7. Middleware stack of the RPC server.

Middleware	Function
CORS	Cross-Origin Resource Sharing for browser dApps
Size Limiter	Max request body: 10 MB
Logging	Structured request/response logging
Auth	API key validation for protected endpoints
DDoS	Rate limiting and connection throttling
Timeout	Request timeout enforcement
TLS	Optional HTTPS via Rustls

13 ZK-Ready Infrastructure

Sxiaum state transition function and Verkle updates are representable within arithmetized circuits. Supported proof systems include Groth16 (zk-SNARK), SP1 (zk-STARK), and Plonk (universal SNARK). Light clients can verify block execution integrity without performing full state transitions.

14 Node Architecture & Operational Modes

14.1 Operating Modes

Table 8. Node operating modes.

Mode	Consensus	Execution	RPC	Storage
Validator	Proposes & votes	Full parallel EVM	Yes	Full state
Full Node	Follows chain	Full parallel EVM	Yes	Full state
Light Client	Header sync only	None	Limited	Headers

14.2 Hardware Requirements

Table 9. Hardware requirements.

Resource	Minimum (Light)	Recommended (Validator)
CPU	4 Cores	16+ Cores
RAM	8 GB	32 GB
Disk	100 GB SSD	1 TB NVMe
Network	20 Mbps	1 Gbps

15 Genesis Configuration & Validator Economics

The DevNet launches with 4 validators, each staking 1,000,000 SXiaum tokens with equal voting power (2,500,000 each, 25% weight). Genesis allocations provide 1,000,000,000 SXiaum tokens per validator for testing.

Important: Pre-funded assets are strictly for development and stress-testing. They hold absolutely zero real-world value. Any attempt to misuse testnet tokens is a direct violation of the builder ethos.

16 Block Explorer & Analytics Infrastructure

Sxiaum includes a built-in block explorer ([SXiaum-explorer](#)) with a high-performance [BlockIndexer](#) that polls the RPC node, indexes blocks and transactions into SQLite, and serves a real-time dashboard at port 3000 showing network height, live TPS, validator status, and finality latency.

17 CLI & Developer Tooling

Table 10. Sxiaum CLI command reference.

Category	Command	Description
Account	<code>account generate</code>	Generate a new Ed25519 keypair
Account	<code>account list-devnet</code>	Display pre-funded DevNet accounts
Account	<code>account import</code>	Import an existing private key
Transaction	<code>transaction send</code>	Submit a value transfer
Transaction	<code>transaction pending</code>	List pending mempool transactions
Query	<code>query balance</code>	Check account balance
Query	<code>query state-root</code>	Get current state root hash
Node	<code>node status</code>	Query node health
Node	<code>node peers</code>	List connected peers

MetaMask is configured with Network Name: Sxiaum DevNet, RPC URL: `http://127.0.0.1:8080/rpc`, Chain ID: 2018131581 (0x78637a7d), Currency Symbol: SXiaum.

18 Performance Benchmarks & Competitive Analysis

18.1 Benchmark Targets

Table 11. Performance benchmark targets.

Metric	Sxiaum	Legacy EVM	Improvement
Max TPS (Transfers)	4,500+	100–300	15–45×
Max TPS (Contracts)	1,200+	15–50	24–80×
Time to Finality	1.2 s	12 min (ETH)	600×
State Proof Size	~2.5 KB	>100 KB	40×
Block Time	1.0 s	12 s (ETH)	12×
Parallel Efficiency	8.5×	1.0×	8.5×

18.2 Throughput Analysis

The theoretical maximum throughput is:

$$\text{TPS}_{\max} = \frac{G_{\text{block}}}{G_{\text{tx}} \times T_{\text{block}}} = \frac{100,000,000}{210 \times 1.0} \approx 476,190 \quad (\text{gas-limited}) \quad (11)$$

In practice, throughput is bounded by execution scheduling, network propagation, and consensus latency, yielding 4,500+ TPS for transfers.

18.3 Competitive Landscape

Table 12. Competitive landscape matrix.

Feature	Sxiaum	Ethereum	Solana	Aptos/Sui
Language	Rust	Solidity (EVM)	Rust/C++	Move/Rust
EVM Support	Native (Par.)	Native (Seq.)	Via Neon (L2)	Limited
Finality	<1.2 s	~12.8 min	0.4–12.8 s	<1 s
State	Verkle Trees	MPT	Flat Accounts	Sparse MT
MEV	Commit-Reveal	Flashbots	Priority/Jito	Bullshark
ZK Proofs	Native	Moving to L2	N/A	N/A
Migration	Zero	N/A	Full rewrite	Full rewrite

19 Security Model & Threat Analysis

Consensus Security: BFT tolerance up to $f = \lfloor (n-1)/3 \rfloor$ Byzantine validators. Finality is absolute and irreversible.

MEV Security: Information-theoretic guarantee via commitment scheme hiding property (Theorem 7.1).

Network Security: Noise protocol encryption, Ed25519 signatures, TLS for RPC, DDoS middleware.

Key Management: Environment variable injection (`SXiaum_VALIDATOR_KEY`) for production; JSON config for development with explicit warnings.

Audit Status: A formal external security audit is required before mainnet deployment. The current implementation is suitable for DevNet evaluation and protocol research.

20 Flexibility & Future Horizons

- **Modular Architecture:** Independent consensus/execution upgrades.
- **SXiaum-Slices:** Enterprise app-chains inheriting mainnet security.
- **Stateless & Mobile:** Verkle proofs enable mobile validators.
- **AI-Compute:** Parallel engine for AI inference verification and agent interactions.
- **Cross-Chain:** Bridge protocols and shared proof standards.

20.1 Roadmap

Table 13. Development roadmap.

Phase	Timeline	Milestones
Phase 0: Genesis	Complete	DevNet, CLI, RPC API, Explorer
Phase 1: Public Testnet	Q3 2026	External validators, faucet, public RPC
Phase 2: Security	Q4 2026	Formal audit, bug bounty
Phase 3: Mainnet Beta	Q1 2027	Permissioned mainnet, bridges
Phase 4: Mainnet	Q2 2027	Permissionless, full decentralization
Phase 5: Ecosystem	2027+	SXiaum-Slices, ZK provers, mobile validators

21 Governance & Community

Sxiaum is released under the **MIT License**. The project is led by **Praful V Raj** (Lead Developer & Architect) with contributions from the open-source community.

Community Channels:

- Email: hello@Sxiaum.org
- Twitter/X: [@Sxiaum](https://twitter.com/Sxiaum)
- Discord: [Sxiaum Community](https://discord.com/invite/Sxiaum)
- GitHub: github.com/Sxiaum

22 Conclusion

Sxiaum represents a fundamental rethinking of Layer 1 blockchain architecture. By combining **Commit-Reveal MEV protection**, **Parallel EVM execution**, **HotStuff BFT consensus**, and **Verkle Tree state cryptography** into a single, vertically integrated protocol, Sxiaum addresses the three most pressing challenges:

1. **Fairness:** MEV extraction is mathematically eliminated (Theorem 7.1).
2. **Performance:** $8.5\times$ throughput on 8 cores with 1.2 s finality (Algorithm 1).
3. **Scalability:** $40\times$ proof size reduction via Verkle trees (Table 5).

All achieved while maintaining **full Ethereum compatibility**—zero developer migration, same tools, same wallets.

Built for fairness. Built for the future.

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A Gas Schedule Reference

```
1 // Source: crates/execution/src/gas.rs
2 pub const INTRINSIC_GAS: u64 = 210;
3 pub const VALUE_TRANSFER_GAS: u64 = 210;
4 pub const STORAGE_READ_GAS: u64 = 48; // Verkle storage access cost
5 pub const STORAGE_WRITE_GAS: u64 = 200;
6 pub const CALldata_GAS: u64 = 1; // Per non-zero byte
7
8 // Intrinsic gas calculation:
9 // gas = INTRINSIC_GAS
10 // for each byte in tx.data:
11 //   if byte != 0: gas += CALldata_GAS (1)
12 //   if byte == 0: gas += 4
```

Listing 1. Gas constants from `crates/execution/src/gas.rs`.

B DevNet Configuration

```
1 {
2   "chain_id": "SXium_devnet_1",
3   "initial_height": 0,
4   "genesis_timestamp": 1712073600,
5   "protocol": {
6     "max_block_gas": 100000000,
7     "max_tx_size_bytes": 131072,
8     "block_time_ms": 1000
9   },
10  "consensus": {
11    "algorithm": "chained_hotstuff",
12    "quorum_ratio": 0.67,
13    "view_timeout_ms": 5000,
14    "pacemaker_interval_ms": 250,
15    "sharding_enabled": false
16  }
17 }
```

Listing 2. DevNet genesis configuration (`configs/devnet.json`).

C

Crate Architecture

```

1 SXiaum/
2 +-- bin/
3 |   +-- node/           --> SXiaum binary (main entry point)
4 |   +-- cli/            --> SXiaum-cli binary (command-line tool)
5 +-- crates/
6 |   +-- types/          --> Core types: Account, Address, Transaction
7 |   +-- crypto/         --> SHA-256, Ed25519, hashing primitives
8 |   +-- block/          --> Block, BlockHeader, BlockBody structures
9 |   +-- networking/     --> libp2p P2P layer, gossip, sync
10 |  +-- mempool/         --> Transaction pool, commit-reveal
11 |  +-- consensus/      --> HotStuff BFT, Proposer, Vote, QC
12 |  +-- execution/      --> Parallel EVM, gas metering
13 |  +-- state/          --> Verkle tree state database
14 |  +-- storage/        --> redb persistent storage engine
15 |  +-- rpc/            --> JSON-RPC server, REST, middleware
16 |  +-- zk/             --> ZK proof generation (Groth16/SP1)
17 |  +-- light-client/    --> Light client verification
18 |  +-- node/           --> Node runtime, startup, services
19 +-- network/
20   +-- explorer/        --> Block explorer (indexer + dashboard)

```

Listing 3. Workspace structure.

D

Supported RPC Methods

Table 14. Supported Ethereum-compatible RPC methods.

Method	Response
eth_chainId	"0x78637a7d"
eth_networkId	"2018131581"
eth_gasPrice	"0x1"
eth_blockNumber	Current block height (hex)
eth_getBalance	Account balance (hex)
eth_sendRawTransaction	Tx hash (with auto Commit-Reveal)
eth_call	Call result
eth_getTransactionReceipt	Receipt object
web3_clientVersion	"SXiaum/0.1.0"

E

Glossary

Term	Definition
MEV	Maximal Extractable Value — profit from reordering/inserting transactions
OCC	Optimistic Concurrency Control — parallel execution with conflict detection
BFT	Byzantine Fault Tolerance — consensus despite malicious actors
QC	Quorum Certificate — cryptographic proof of supermajority agreement
IPA	Inner Product Argument — polynomial commitment for Verkle trees
KZG	Kate-Zaverucha-Goldberg — polynomial commitment scheme
STF	State Transition Function — deterministic state update function
SNARK	Succinct Non-interactive Argument of Knowledge
STARK	Scalable Transparent Argument of Knowledge
MPT	Merkle Patricia Trie — Ethereum's legacy state structure
DHT	Distributed Hash Table — decentralized key-value lookup

F

The Ethereum Synergy — Why EVM?

Sxiaum decision to maintain 100% EVM compatibility is a strategic architectural choice:

- 1. Massive Developer Ecosystem:** 10+ years of Solidity libraries and battle-tested templates (OpenZeppelin).
- 2. Industry-Standard Tooling:** Foundry, Hardhat, Truffle, and Remix work without modification.
- 3. Seamless User Experience:** MetaMask, Rabby, and all Web3 wallets supported natively.
- 4. Liquidity & Asset Portability:** ERC-20/ERC-721 assets move freely between Sxiaum and Ethereum.
- 5. Future-Proofing via L2s:** Seamless integration with L2 scaling solutions and bridges.



Sxiaum

Built for fairness. Built for the future.

Protocol Version:	Sxiaum v0.1.0
Network Phase:	DevNet / Testnet
Chain ID:	2018131581 (0x78637a7d)
Language:	Rust
License:	MIT License

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